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The George W. Bush administration will long be remembered for its constitutional and
legal arguments on behalf of exclusive and inherent executive power. In its extreme form, this
uncompromising effort appears to have failed, and may even have pushed the judicial branch to
limit executive authority and return to a more traditional insistence on interbranch cooperation
in foreign affairs. Ironically, the Bush-Cheney legal legacy ultimately will depend on the
Barack Obama administration’s public commitments and legal arguments, but early evidence
suggests that President Obama’s assertions of executive power will rest less on assertions of
constitutional prerogative, and more heavily on statutory delegation as well as long-standing
judicial precedent.
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It is no secret that long before his election as vice president, Dick Cheney was
deeply committed to the proposition that the executive branch had been dangerously
diminished in the aftermath of the Watergate scandals. The period after Watergate and
the Vietnam War, Cheney told reporters on Air Force Two in 2005, was “the nadir of the
modern presidency in terms of authority and legitimacy,” a period in which the chief
executive’s ability to lead “in a complicated, dangerous era” was severely diminished
(Baker and VandeHei 2005). Cheney returned to the White House as the second-ranking
official in the George W. Bush administration in 2001 determined to restore executive
branch power and autonomy. To do so, Cheney pushed others in the administration
to aggressively press legal arguments and constitutional assertions not only to achieve
their immediate policy goals, but also to set lasting precedents, fortifying the nation’s
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predisposition toward deference to—and acceptance of—executive prerogative powers in
foreign and domestic affairs alike (Cheney 1990, 2009).
Just nine days after Bush and Cheney were inaugurated in 2001, the White House
hosted a series of energy policy discussions with key industry leaders. When asked to
reveal the names of those involved in drafting these policy proposals, however, the White
House refused, asserting sweeping new claims of executive privilege (Gellman 2008;
Hayes 2007; Savage 2008).1 This, it turns out, was only the first of a long train of
arguments asserting executive authority. The Bush legal team fought battle after battle
in areas ranging from questions about the interpretation and application of treaties
(Goldsmith 2007; Yoo 2005) to wiretapping (Fisher 2007a, 2008a; Savage 2008), and
from war powers (Fisher 2004) to military commissions and interrogation techniques.
But will these efforts succeed in fundamentally shifting the national understanding of the
allocation and separation of powers? Will the Bush-Cheney legal legacy in the separation
of powers be a lasting one?
Early indications suggest not only that the Bush lawyers failed to embed and
entrench their claims, but that the U.S. Supreme Court, along with the new Barack
Obama administration, actually may be returning to the more traditional foundations of
executive power, built on statutes and long-standing judicial doctrine. Far from shifting
our constitutional understanding of executive power, the Bush-Cheney legal legacy may
be a return to the very assumptions and foundations they sought to replace.

Shifting Default Assumptions in the Separation of Powers
Bush administration lawyers recognized that how they won their cases was critically
important if they wanted to fundamentally reallocate power and authority to the executive branch. By pressing the Supreme Court to revise and redirect the general rules,
starting points, and thresholds that set guidelines for the lower courts, the administration
could shape and direct the broader standards and judicial doctrine, signaling to Congress
the boundaries and limits that could (and, in the administration’s view, should) constrain
their choices. Borrowing from the world of computers and software design, we might
think of these general rules and starting points for the analysis of the allocation of powers
as the default assumptions with which judicial decision making begins.2
“Default settings” are those with which a computer program starts. Wordprocessing programs, for example, are designed to open with an initial template, preset1. The National Energy Policy Development Group was established by a January 29, 2001, executive order, and was chaired by Vice President Cheney. The secrecy involved was challenged, and ultimately
upheld, by the Supreme Court in Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
2. The Oxford English Dictionary notes that in computing, a default is a preselected setting that is
used unless an alternative has been specified. The earliest use of the word in this sense, the OED notes, is
attributed to G. M. Weinberg, in 1966, who wrote that “the use of default attributes can contribute to the
ease of writing and modifying a program.” (G. M. Weinberg PL/1 Programming Primer iv. 74). Much the same
can be said of precedent and judicial default assumptions. A default in computer science, the American
Heritage Dictionary notes, is a “setting or value for a variable that is assigned automatically by an operating
system and remains in effect unless canceled or overridden by the operator,” or a “situation or condition that
obtains in the absence of active intervention.”
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ting things such as the margins, size of type, and the font to be used. These can all be
overridden or changed in particular cases, but they provide the initial template with
which the process begins each time. Judicial doctrine—particularly for the Supreme
Court—works in a similar fashion. While it does not determine the outcome in any
particular case, and the Court is free to reverse or modify its own decisions, the Court does
develop decision rules that provide an initial orientation to analyze particular claims
(Silverstein 2009, 63-95, 281-83). The Bush-Cheney legal team clearly committed itself
to efforts to shift these initial decision rules, or default assumptions, in its effort to
fundamentally rebalance the separation of powers. This commitment appears to have
been, in some cases, even more important than the shorter-term objective of winning
favorable rulings in particular cases.

Separation of Powers and Foreign Policy
The Supreme Court has never accepted the idea that war, emergency, and foreign
policy are free of all judicial constraints. The Court has intervened in foreign policy cases
many times, even when the government insisted that these rulings might imperil
national security (Fisher 2005; Silverstein 1997). Though Congress has been deferential
in some eras, and more aggressive in others, the Court consistently has maintained that
(1) the national government (Congress and the president, together) has broad but not
unlimited power in foreign affairs; (2) specific limits or restrictions in the Constitution
apply to foreign and domestic policy alike—including provisions assigning powers to the
judicial branch itself—and these will be enforced by the Supreme Court even in war and
emergencies; and (3) Congress holds a great deal of constitutional authority (should it
choose to exercise that authority) in both foreign and domestic affairs.3 These tenets have
not changed. What has changed are the thresholds that need to be met (or exceeded)
before the Court will intervene and block or reverse government actions.
There are a number of traditional default assumptions that structure the Court’s
decisions on foreign policy. One of the oldest was announced by Chief Justice John
Marshall in the 1804 case of Little v. Barreme, in which a naval officer claimed immunity
from prosecution for violating a statute because, he said, he was following orders he had
received from President John Adams (Fisher 2004, 25-26; Alfange 1996, 274-87).4 The
question for the Court was, could the orders of the president provide immunity for a naval
officer executing those orders in good faith—even if the orders were, in fact, in violation
of statutory law? Marshall said no. The president’s “instructions cannot change the nature
3. Many insist that the 1936 case of U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation undercuts this assertion.
This badly misunderstood and often misquoted case does no such thing. (For a full discussion, see Fisher
2007b, 2008b; Silverstein 1997, 37-41.)
4. It is a question that may have particular salience for former members of the Bush administration
now that the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California has ruled that José Padilla—who was
designated an enemy combatant and for more than three years was held in U.S. military prisons, where he
alleges he was subjected to torture—would be allowed to sue former deputy attorney general John Yoo for
his role in authorizing this treatment. If this case sets a precedent, others no doubt will follow, with suits
aimed at any number of Bush administration officials who believed they were carrying out the president’s
directives (Padilla and Lebrun v. Yoo, 2009).
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of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a
plain trespass.” The orders of a superior, even the orders of the commander in chief,
provide no legal cover for anyone who breaks the law.5
The most familiar default assumption that has long governed any conversation
about the constitutional allocation of powers in foreign policy was outlined by Justice
Robert Jackson in his concurrence in the 1952 steel seizure case (Youngstown Sheet & Tube
v. Sawyer). Jackson argued that in deciding what a president could or could not do, cases
could be divided into three groups. In one, in which a president “takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress” (where the president acts
against the express will of Congress), the president’s power is at its most circumscribed,
and he or she can do only that which the Constitution explicitly allocates exclusively to
the chief executive. At the other end of the spectrum are cases in which the president
“acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.” When the elected
branches—the national government—act together, Jackson wrote, the president’s “authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate.” In these circumstances, the national government is free to act
unless doing so would violate an explicit prohibition in the Constitution. But what
happens between these extremes, when the president and Congress have concurrent
powers? At what point does the president’s power stop, and congressional power begin?
In the steel seizure case, Jackson made clear that congressional silence could not be
read as tacit approval—explicit congressional authorization would be needed before the
president could act in what he called the “zone of twilight.” By the early 1980s, with a
very different Court in place, it seemed that this default assumption (congressional silence
does not equal consent) might be shifting to its opposite—the assumption that a president
could act unless and until Congress explicitly tried to stop that action (congressional silence,
then, would be read as tacit consent). This change was reflected in the Court’s ruling in Dames
& Moore v. Regan in 1981, a case that challenged the deal worked out to free American hostages
being held in Iran. The courts, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote in his majority opinion
in that case, cannot expect Congress to “anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible
action the President may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in which he
might act” (Dames & Moore v. Regan, 678). Seizing on two statutes—one of which actually
was designed to limit executive power—Rehnquist concluded that because Congress had
not formally foreclosed or forbidden these options, these statutes actually indicated that
“Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by Executive agreement”
(Dames & Moore v Regan, 680; emphasis added).6
Dames & Moore formally shifted the default assumption that had prevailed since the
steel seizure case: whereas once a president operating in constitutionally ambiguous
5. The Bush administration took a rather different view. In his confirmation hearings in October
2007, Attorney General Michael Mukasey was asked whether the president could authorize a subordinate to
act in violation of an explicit statute. He could if the president was acting “within the authority of the
President to defend the country,” Mukasey told the Senate Judiciary Committee. In that case, “the President
is not putting somebody above the law; the President is putting somebody within the law” (Shennon 2007).
6. The International Economic Emergency Powers Act (1977) was designed to reduce and limit
previously authorized executive emergency powers (Silverstein 1997, 178-80; 2009, 224-28).
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territory needed explicit congressional support to avoid the most searching judicial
scrutiny, now congressional silence might be read as tacit approval. To block the president would now require Congress to act affirmatively: Dames & Moore signaled that the
Court might be open to further shifts in the executive’s direction.

The Bush Administration: Redefining Judicial Defaults in
Foreign Policy
America’s eighteenth-century constitution makes no clear and unique provisions
for events such as those that took place on September 11, 2001. How should the
government organize a response to attacks from organized groups, under no formal
military command, which wear no uniforms, and never have signed an international
protocol or treaty? That the chief executive might respond in ways the Constitution never
authorized is not surprising in a moment of crisis. But the Bush administration went well
beyond that, turning to a team of lawyers to develop, coordinate, articulate, and defend
the exercise of inherent executive power not as a temporary response to emergency, but as
a fundamental constitutional right and responsibility (Goldsmith 2007; Yoo 2005,
2007).
George W. Bush was not the first president to assert that Article II of the Constitution bestows broad and inherent powers. But, unlike Bush, the others paired their
rhetorical claims for executive power with statutory provisions from Congress that
actually allocated and authorized those claims. Abraham Lincoln secured broad statutory
support shortly after the Civil War began, as did Franklin D. Roosevelt in World War II.
Dwight D. Eisenhower went to Congress for broad powers in dealing with military
challenges in Taiwan and the Middle East, and even Lyndon B. Johnson secured legislative support from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before escalating U.S. involvement in
Vietnam. Richard M. Nixon pressed inherent powers claims to new heights, most fully
articulating those claims after he left office (D. Frost 2007; Silverstein 1997). By contrast,
the development and defense of inherent executive power was of central concern to the
Bush White House (Fisher 2008a; Goldsmith 2007; Pfiffner 2008; Savage 2008; Wittes
2008; Yoo 2005, 2007).
Faced with an unprecedented crisis in 2001, the Bush administration acted as it saw
fit, as had other presidents faced with immediate crises, including Thomas Jefferson
and Lincoln. But unlike Jefferson and Lincoln, the Bush administration did not come
to Congress later for post hoc authorization. To do so would be to acknowledge, as
Jefferson and Lincoln did, that final authority and power rested with Congress, and
not the executive (Silverstein 1997). Like Jefferson, who worried that the Constitution
did not permit him to execute the Louisiana Purchase, and Lincoln, who suspended
habeas corpus, called up the militia, and ordered blockades despite the lack of clear
constitutional authority to do so, the Bush administration certainly knew that Congress
in the shadow of a crisis would willingly authorize just about anything Bush asked. And
yet Bush and his administration resisted asking Congress to authorize military commissions for the Guantánamo detainees; insisted that they needed no authorization from
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Congress or the judiciary to order warrantless national security wiretaps; claimed that
neither Congress nor the judiciary could constitutionally interfere with their nearly
unlimited authority to use force where and as the president saw fit; and insisted that the
administration was free to interpret treaties or ignore them, particularly those concerning
the treatment of prisoners in general, and torture in particular (Yoo and Delahunty 2001,
2002). All of these and more, they said, were constitutionally left to the executive and the
executive alone (Yoo 2005).
Lawyers within the Bush administration with deep intellectual and political
passions—including Jack Goldsmith, Jay Bybee, John Yoo, Patrick Philbin, and Robert
Delahunty, among others—developed aggressive legal theories that they believed would
reset the constitutional debate and fortify President Bush’s specific constitutional claims
to exercise inherent power, claiming that in foreign affairs, the president alone has final
authority, and when the national security is imperiled (a judgment left to the executive),
the president is legitimately entitled to override constitutional and statutory constraints
to preserve and protect that security (Yoo 2005). Their goal was not simply to support
policy choices the administration had made in the midst of an emergency, but rather to
assert that these executive actions were a matter of constitutional right, resetting the
default allocation and distribution of power at the national level.
The administration deployed a number of weapons in this struggle: public statements by the president and vice president (Pfiffner 2008; Savage 2008); formal legal
opinions authored by the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department, the White
House Counsel’s office, and the Office of General Counsel in the Defense Department;
signing statements attached to legislation, and briefs submitted in litigation before the
federal courts. In all of these, the Bush administration consistently asserted independent
and unfettered powers that could not constitutionally be interfered with by Congress or
even by the federal courts. In signing a defense appropriations bill in 2005 that contained
a provision banning torture, President Bush wrote,
The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to detainees,
in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the
unitary Executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional
limitations on the judicial power, which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the
Congress and the President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American people from
further terrorist attacks. (Bush 2005; emphasis added)

The legal briefs, the public rhetoric, the internal memos, and the signing statements were
all aimed, ultimately, at the U.S. Supreme Court, which the Bush administration understood would be the most important battleground for their effort to shift default assumptions and redraw the lines separating the powers of the national government.

Winning the Battles, Losing the War?
The first prominent test came when the Supreme Court considered a challenge to
the administration’s authority to seize, hold, and, in some cases, try citizens and non-
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citizens alike who were accused of being enemy combatants. It took a few years, but in
2004, the Supreme Court finally accepted a case that would test some of these assertions.
The result was not exactly what the Bush-Cheney legal team had hoped. Writing for a
plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor insisted that the 2001
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) statute passed by Congress provided
sufficient authority for the government to offer only an extremely truncated procedure for
determining whether or not Yaser Esam Hamdi—a U.S. citizen who had been seized in
Afghanistan—could be held as an illegal combatant in a military prison. The Bush
administration not only wanted to hold Hamdi, but also wanted the Court to rule that
they could do so under the president’s authority as commander in chief and general
administrative authority as the chief executive and head of the executive branch of
government. And they wanted the Court to rule that the judicial branch itself was
precluded from reviewing these claims through habeas petitions. After making quite
clear that the judicial branch would do no such thing, Justice O’Connor and the Court
insisted that existing statutes provided sufficient legislative support for the executive
action. This allowed the Court to authorize the president’s policy choices, without
endorsing the Bush administration’s broader constitutional claims.
Rasul v. Bush (2004) dealt the administration another setback in a similar constitutional gambit. This time, the administration asserted that U.S. federal courts “lack
jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals
captured abroad . . . incarcerated at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.” Administration lawyers were confident that the only direct precedent that seemed relevant to this
case—Johnson v. Eisentrager (1950)—supported their assertion that federal courts lacked
jurisdiction (Yoo and Philbin 2001). But Justice John Paul Stevens, in his majority
opinion in Rasul, rejected these claims. In Eisentrager, the detainees were nationals of
countries formally at war with the United States. Not so in the Rasul case, Stevens wrote.
The Rasul detainees also differed from those in Eisentrager because they denied that they
were engaged in or plotting acts of aggression against the United States, never had access
to any sort of tribunal, had not seen any formal charges against them, and had been held
in a place (Guantánamo) over which the United States had exercised exclusive and
complete jurisdiction since 1903.7
The next year (2005) brought to a close the odd saga of José Padilla, an American
citizen seized at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago in 2002 as a suspect in a plot
to detonate a “dirty bomb” inside the United States. Designated an enemy combatant by
the Bush administration, Padilla was held without formal charges or hearings in U.S.
military prisons. Padilla sued, and eventually the case came before a three-judge panel of
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond, Virginia. The circuit court ruled that
the administration could hold Padilla indefinitely in military detention—the policy
outcome the administration sought. The administration, however, was far from pleased,
because the ruling did not build on any sort of executive prerogative, but rather an act of
Congress. “We conclude,” Judge J. Michael Luttig wrote for the circuit court in
7. The detainees in Eisentrager were held in a German prison, though by Americans who had
temporary control of the prison.
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September 2005, that the president possessed this authority “pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution enacted by Congress” (Padilla v. Hanft,
423 F.3d 386, 2005).
Before Padilla’s next appeal could be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, the
administration suddenly filed papers to shift Padilla out of the military system, instead
pressing specific charges against him in civil court. This is, oddly, what Padilla had long
been demanding, and what Luttig had declined to order the administration to do.
Abandoning their effort, however, not only avoided the possibility of a Supreme Court
defeat in this particular case, but more importantly, it avoided the risk of yet another
Supreme Court ruling that would further limit the president’s authority in foreign policy,
pushing the defaults in directions opposite those the administration sought.8
In 2006, Salim Ahmed Hamdan’s case provided the Court with the opportunity the
administration tried so hard to deny it in the Padilla case. A driver for Osama bin Laden,
Hamdan was captured in Afghanistan and held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. He filed
petitions with the district court challenging the administration’s authority to use military commissions to try him, adding that the commissions the Bush administration
proposed violated the Geneva Accords, an international treaty to which the United States
was a signatory.9 In a 5-3 decision, the Supreme Court agreed, ruling that the Geneva
Accords were law—enforceable in the federal courts—and that military commissions as
the administration had deployed them in this case actually violated the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. In short, the president lacked inherent authority to create military
commissions. Congress was more than willing to provide the appropriate statutory cover
for the administration, and promptly passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006,
solving the administration’s immediate problem. But, in the process, the Court had once
again made clear that presidential power in this realm rested heavily on statutory
authority, dealing yet another blow to the administration’s longer-range efforts to shift
the underlying default assumptions in favor of independent Article II authority.
The Military Commissions Act went far beyond simply setting up a statutory
framework for military tribunals. Then–Republican Senate Judiciary Committee chairman Arlen Specter ushered a bill through the Senate that provided blanket statutory
authority for the new procedures and eliminated the remaining avenues for habeas
petitions, stripping the federal courts of the authority to hear these claims and, in effect,
reversing the Court’s decision in Rasul. This set the stage for a case that might force the
Court to confront the underlying constitutional questions that the administration sought
to address. The opportunity came in a case in which the administration was no longer
asserting power against Congress—but this time in a case in which Congress, together with
the administration, was asserting power against the judiciary itself.
The Court’s response came in a stinging 5-4 ruling written by Justice Anthony
Kennedy in Boumediene v. Bush. The right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus is so
8. In March 2009, the new Obama administration’s decision to try Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri in a
civilian court similarly snatched away an opportunity for the Supreme Court to formally reconsider its default
assumptions about executive power regarding detainees (Al-Marri v. Spagone, 08-368).
9. Common Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention precludes the use of evidence to convict a
prisoner unless the prisoner has had a chance to see or hear that evidence and to present a defense.
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central to the American constitutional system, the majority ruled, that there is only one
way to suspend its application—by following the formal and explicit procedure required
by Article I, Section 9, clause 2 of the Constitution.10 While the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 had explicitly stripped the district
courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas pleas coming out of Guantánamo, Congress had
explicitly not “suspended” the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The administration
had also rested a good deal of its claim to unfettered power on the fact that Guantánamo
was neither fish nor fowl: neither a part of the United States, nor under the control of a
foreign sovereign, and thus outside the jurisdiction of American federal courts. But the
Court insisted that because Guantánamo was under the total physical control of the
United States, American forces at Guantánamo were subject to constitutional limits and
statutory rules, including treaties such as the Geneva Accords that were incorporated into
American law. The executive, the Court added, cannot simply execute a lease agreement
with a foreign government to “contract away” constitutional provisions. While there may
be times when the Court must abstain from certain questions concerning the boundaries
of sovereignty, Kennedy insisted, “to hold that the political branches have the power to
switch the Constitution on or off at will” is quite another thing altogether. Such a
position “would permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government,
leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, not this Court, say ‘what the
law is.’ ”11
The Bush administration’s legal theories appeared to be making little headway with
the Court. The cases made clear that the Court would not allow the administration on its
own and without the correct statutory support to do these things as extensions of some
sort of broad constitutional authority—whether an extension of the commander-in-chief
power, the “take care” clause, or a general Article II, unitary executive claim. But the
national government, the executive together with Congress, most certainly could do these
things. And because Congress proved more than eager to hand the president just about
any authorization the White House sought—the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, the 2008 Telecom Immunity Bill/Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments—the Court’s rulings seemed to pose hardly
any serious barrier to the executive’s policy goals. The rulings did, however, pose a very
serious barrier to the broader effort of the Bush-Cheney legal team to shift and redefine
the default assumptions that would govern the separation of powers for years to come.

Obama: Old Wine in Old Bottles?
The Bush administration’s overreach in attempting to reset the default assumptions
on executive power had begun to produce a clear backlash by the time Barack Obama
took the stage in Chicago on November 4, 2008, as president-elect. Any hope that the
10. “The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”
11. Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. ____ (2008).
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Bush-Cheney agenda on executive power might take root and flower in the short term,
any possibility that their efforts to reset the defaults might take quick and solid hold with
the courts, would now depend upon the Obama administration.
Entrenchment of the Bush-Cheney doctrine, of course, seemed unimaginable in
the aftermath of the Obama campaign. After all, Obama had repeatedly distanced
himself from the Bush-Cheney position on everything from signing statements to
Guantánamo, from warrantless wiretapping to extraordinary rendition. And those
headed for high-level positions in the Obama Justice Department, including Dawn
Johnsen and Marty Lederman, had spent years attacking John Yoo and the theories of
executive prerogative that had emerged from the Office of Legal Counsel (Barron and
Lederman 2008).
Less than six months into the new administration, many of Obama’s staunch
supporters have been surprised—even appalled—that the new president not only had
failed to fully repudiate many of the Bush-Cheney legal policies, but in some instances,
actually seems to be embracing and extending those policy choices (Gerstein 2009;
Goldsmith 2009a, 2009b; Greenwald 2009a, 2009b; Herbert 2009; Savage 2009a). In
areas ranging from the assertion of the state secrets privilege in efforts to shut down
lawsuits over warrantless wiretapping (Al-Haramain v. Obama; Jewel v. NSA) and extraordinary rendition (Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan) to those concerning lawsuits over
detention and treatment at Guantánamo (Bostan v. Obama) and the reach of habeas corpus
to Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan (Al Maqaleh v. Gates), as well as the continuing
use of signing statements, the new Obama administration’s policies in a number of areas
that were of intense interest during the campaign certainly do appear less dramatically
different than one might have expected. Does this suggest that Obama actually will
salvage and enhance the Bush-Cheney legal legacy?
Early evidence suggests the answer is no. There is a critical difference between
policy and the legal foundation on which that policy is constructed. The policies may
be quite similar, at least in the first few months of the new administration, but the
legal legacy will turn on the underlying legal arguments, the legal foundation on
which these policies are built. Here we find a dramatic difference between Obama and
Bush. Both are clearly interested in maintaining strong executive power, but whereas
Bush built his claims on broad constitutional arguments, insisting that the executive
could act largely unhampered by the other branches of government, the Obama administration has made clear that its claims to power are built on statutes passed by Congress, along with interpretations and applications of existing judicial doctrines. It may
be the case, as one of the Bush administration’s leading Office of Legal Counsel attorneys argued, that far from reversing Bush-era policies, the new administration “has
copied most of the Bush program, has expanded some of it, and has narrowed only a
bit” (Goldsmith 2009a). But what is profoundly different are the constitutional and
legal default foundations on which these policies, and the assertions of executive power
to enforce them, are built.
Obama, like virtually every chief executive in American History, seems committed
to building and holding executive power. But unlike Bush, Obama is developing a far
more traditional approach to this task, building his claims not on constitutional asser-
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tions of inherent power, but rather interpreting and applying existing statutes and
judicial doctrines or, where needed, seeking fresh and expansive legislative support for his
claims.
In the various cases concerning those captured and held in the years since 9/11,
ranging from challenges to habeas corpus to extraordinary rendition, from warrantless
wiretaps to the suppression of photos documenting torture in Abu Ghraib, the legal
foundation has shifted in important ways. Unlike Bush, who asserted “a unilateral,
inherent, sweeping theory of Commander-in-Chief power,” the Obama administration
pursues its policy by “getting congressional authorization statutes” (Greenwald 2009a).
White House spokesman Robert Gibbs, in fact, noted that “[w]hile the administration
is considering a series of options” concerning military detainees, for example, “none relies
on legal theories that we have the inherent authority to detain people” (Savage 2009b).

New Wine in Even Older Bottles
Far from setting new default assumptions, the Obama administration seems determined to head back to the famous steel seizure categories outlined by Justice Jackson
in the 1952 Youngstown case. In a speech at West Point, Obama attorney general Eric
Holder insisted that while his staff was struggling with how to handle detainees from
Guantánamo who are too dangerous to release, and yet cannot be easily prosecuted in
federal court, “I pledge that the ultimate solution will be one that is grounded in our
Constitution, based on congressional enactments, in compliance with international laws
of war, and consistent with the rule of law” (Holder 2009). A survey of the Obama
administration’s legal arguments in three legal/policy domains illustrates this pattern:
(1) Guantánamo and the power to detain; (2) secrecy and the Freedom of Information Act;
and (3) state secrets, warrantless wiretaps, and suits over extraordinary rendition.
Guantánamo and the Power to Detain. Here the Obama administration insists
that it continues to work to develop its own comprehensive policy, but in the interim,
given that there are pending cases before the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, the Obama Department of Justice has filed papers in which its reliance is
thoroughly and totally placed on congressional statutes. In a “Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority,” the Department of Justice says,
categorically, that “[t]he United States bases its detention authority as to such persons on
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF),” passed by Congress in 2001.12
The government then cites the Supreme Court ruling in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which relied
not on Bush claims to inherent executive authority, but rather on the AUMF as providing
statutory authority. In fact, the administration memo references the AUMF 28 times in
the 12-page document. “Congress authorized the President. . . . ” and “This authority is
derived from the AUMF. . . . ” and detention “in this armed conflict is consistent with the
AUMF . . . ” (Department of Justice memo, “In Re: Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litiga12. Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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tion”). Nowhere in this memo is there any mention of the commander in chief, Article
II, the unitary executive, or prerogative power. In fact, to the degree that the administration does suggest there needs to be deference by the courts, it is deference to the
political branches (plural) and not to the executive or the commander in chief (DOJ
memorandum, footnote 2, p. 8).
In an Associated Press interview on July 2, 2009, President Obama acknowledged
the Court’s determination that Guantánamo detainees “have habeas rights, and that
means that they are able to answer charges and have legal representation. We’re going to
be able to prosecute a sizable number of those who are being held in our U.S. courts,” he
said, arguing that the “military commissions structure that we are setting up, I think,
will meet the demands of our legal traditions.” Asked whether he might use executive
orders to establish this framework, Obama replied that he was “not comfortable with
doing something this significant through executive order. I think it is very important
that the American people and Congress, in conjunction with my administration, come up
with a structure that is not only legitimate in the eyes of our constitutional traditions,
but also in the eyes of the international community, because part of our task in defeating
these extremists is winning over allies and populations that right now feel as if we haven’t
been living up to our highest ideals.”13
Secrecy and the Freedom of Information Act. Here Obama’s supporters have been
aghast (Greenwald 2009b). Bush administration critics eagerly anticipated that Obama
would shine a bright light on the previous administration’s legacy of torture by releasing
photos from Abu Ghraib prison. The Obama administration, however, was deeply
concerned that these photos might stir up violent anti-American reactions around the
world, and in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, where reaction might put American
troops in jeopardy. In the U.S. Senate, South Carolina Republican Lindsay Graham joined
with Connecticut’s Joe Lieberman to attach an amendment to the military appropriations
supplemental funding bill in June 2009 that would allow the president, and the Pentagon, at their discretion, to classify and suppress any photos “relating to the treatment of
individuals engaged, or captured or detained” by U.S. armed forces after September 11,
2001. The amendment was widely denounced by civil libertarians. In terms of the policy
itself (withholding the photos), it certainly did not appear to represent the sort of change
many thought they would get with the new administration. But what did represent real
change was the legal arguments on which this policy was built. Under Bush, the
administration relied on its own strained interpretation of the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA), which was the basis for the suit seeking the release of the photos (ACLU v.
Department of Defense). Under Obama, rather than insist on a reinterpretation of FOIA, the
solution seems to be to work with Congress to pass an explicit statute that would formally
delegate the power to withhold these photos.
In an exchange with Attorney General Eric Holder during Senate Judiciary Committee oversight hearings on June 17, 2009, Senator Graham made it clear that there was
13. Associated Press transcript of an interview with President Barack Obama, July 2, 2009. Available
at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090702/ap_on_go_pr_wh/us_obama_ap_interview_text.
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a strong desire to achieve this policy goal through legislation. “Do you agree with me,”
Graham asked Holder, “that it would be the preferred route, in terms of impressing the
Court, that Congress would act on this subject matter, rather than an executive order?”
To which Holder replied, “Yes. I think that having Congress act would be a preferred
way” to proceed. Graham then went on to make clear that legislation in his view was
needed, because then it would be a perfectly “reasonable interpretation of the Freedom of
Information Act as it exists today” to order the release.14
State Secrets, Warrantless Wiretaps, and Suits over Extraordinary Rendition.
Another arena in which the Bush administration left behind an extensive legacy of legal
challenges for Obama concerns the administration’s ability to shut down or limit the
reach and scope of lawsuits that might force disclosure of information that the administration believed posed a real risk to national security.
A series of cases concerning warrantless wiretaps (Jewel v. NSA and Al-Haramain v.
Bush—now v. Obama), as well as a case concerning a suit against a private company
accused of facilitating illegal treatment as part of a Central Intelligence Agency program
of extraordinary rendition to third countries (Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan), have been
moving up and down between the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which supervises that district. In all
of these cases, Bush—and now the Obama administration—has invoked something
called the “state secrets doctrine” to block the release of information they insist would
jeopardize national security (Fisher 2006).
The state secrets doctrine allows the government to withhold evidence in situations
where the government asserts that disclosure would threaten national security. It has been
invoked dozens of times since its first modern application in the 1953 case of United States
v. Reynolds, but following 9/11 it has been invoked with far greater frequency (A. Frost
2007). This seems unsurprising—what is more significant is that it has been invoked not
simply to block the release of particular documents or other pieces of evidence, as it was
initially designed to do, but under the Bush administration, the doctrine was invoked to
dismiss cases entirely, blocking lawsuits against the government as well as government
contractors and private firms. Amanda Frost argues that when the government invoked
the state secrets doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s, it did so “by seeking to limit discovery,
and only rarely filed motions to dismiss the entire litigation.” The Bush administration’s
response, Frost argues, “differs from past practice in that it is seeking blanket dismissal
of every case challenging the constitutionality of specific, ongoing government programs” of warrantless wiretapping (2007, 1939-40).
As long as federal courts were receptive to these more expansive claims—as was a
district court in Virginia, a decision that was upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 2007 (El-Masri v. Tenet)—this would seem to suggest the executive’s growing
power was taking root. But the overreach, the effort to expand a doctrine meant to block
14. Oversight of the Justice Department, hearing of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, June 17,
2009. The amendment was stripped from the supplemental bill in the House. It then passed in the Senate
as a separate piece of legislation. As of early July, it was still being debated in the House.
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the production of specific pieces of evidence into one designed to make entire challenges
and cases simply disappear, could ultimately backfire and end up more significantly
narrowing rather than expanding executive power.
Though the saga of Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Bush (now v. Obama) is
far from over (a new round of arguments is scheduled for September 23, 2009),
Al-Haramain suggests another way in which the Bush-Cheney legal legacy may actually
end up undercutting rather than expanding executive authority.
Al-Haramain is an Islamic charity that sued President Bush and others, alleging
that the organization and its members had been the victims of illegal surveillance and
wiretaps, in violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). They believe
this to be so because they were inadvertently given a secret document in 2004 by the
Treasury Department that apparently made this quite plain. The Bush administration,
and now Obama as well, assert that this document cannot be released or used in court.
Both have invoked the state secrets doctrine as the reason why the document should be
suppressed, and further, why the case itself should simply be dismissed.
For most of the years of the Bush administration, federal courts were quite willing
to accept their state secrets claims and dismiss cases as requested. But as the Bush
administration reached its last few years, some federal judges began to resist these
demands. Al-Haramain, in fact, nicely illustrates one of the ways in which the Bush
administration, far from expanding and embedding unquestioned executive power, may
have overreached, bringing about a judicial backlash that may actually leave a legacy of
reduced, rather than expanded executive power and autonomy.
Bush, and now Obama, have continued to resist the district court’s orders to
produce documents that might allow the Al-Haramain case to proceed, provoking the
chief judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (Vaughn
Walker) to become increasingly strident in his orders and rulings against the government. Far from accepting the blanket claims of state secrets, both the district court and
now a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have insisted that while the state
secrets doctrine might preclude the use of the document, there is actually a statute (FISA)
that may, in fact, preempt the use of the state secrets doctrine. In the conflict between a
judicially constructed doctrine and a statute, the statute would trump. Because of this,
Judge Walker issued clear orders to the government to produce the disputed documents
for his review under the FISA rules.15 When the Obama administration failed to comply,
Walker issued new orders, threatening the government with sanctions.16 Finally, the
Obama administration responded on May 29, 2009, and filed yet another brief on August
20, 2009, in which they again asked the Court to dismiss the case, this time pleading
that the Court should not make sweeping decisions about executive power in a case
concerning “a now lapsed program where an actual case or controversy cannot be
established.”17
15. Order of the Court In Re: National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, Docket
06-1791, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, April 17, 2009.
16. Order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, May 22, 2009.
17. Notice Motion/Memorandum Government’s 4th Motion Dismiss/Summary Judgment; Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion Partial Summary Judgment Al-Haramain v. Obama, August 20, 2009.

892

|

PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2009

Meanwhile, in the extraordinary rendition case of Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, the
administration has again run into a Ninth Circuit weary of accepting blanket claims of
state secrets that would require the dismissal of the entire case, rather than merely the
suppression of particular pieces of evidence. If the Ninth Circuit’s now far more limited
understanding of the state secrets doctrine prevails, the Obama administration well
understands that what has emerged as a rather robust tool for the executive to quash
difficult, embarrassing, and even dangerous cases may be lost. The Obama administration
lawyers have now asked the Ninth Circuit for an en banc hearing by the full court. “No
other court of appeals has so restricted the state secrets privilege,” the Obama appeal
states, adding that “[t]his unprecedented view of the privilege . . . will significantly
hamstring the Government’s ability to prevent the disclosure of highly sensitive state
secrets through litigation.”18
The state secrets privilege is something the courts created—and thus the courts can
remake it, narrow it, or expand it as they choose. In 2007, the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee considered a new law that would actually govern this doctrine, but it never
got a floor vote. That bill has been reintroduced this year, and a similar bill is now under
consideration in the House. Without clear legislation, however, this dispute will have to
be resolved between the administration and the courts. In the event that the Obama
appeal fails, and the doctrine returns to its pre-9/11 dimensions, or perhaps is trimmed
even further, we might have the first real opportunity to see whether the Obama
administration is willing to make a stand against the courts, and refuse to abide by court
orders, insisting instead, much as one might imagine the Bush-Cheney team likely would
have done in the first few years after 9/11, that the administration’s judgment must
prevail over judicial rulings.
The evidence we have so far, however, suggests this is unlikely. In every other area
(and to date in this one as well), the Obama administration has been clearly committed
to working with existing statutes and judicial doctrines, and where these are lacking, to
seek new laws, and to argue for favorable interpretations of existing doctrine. Far from
asserting bold new doctrines of executive power, the Obama administration has so far
seemed intent on going back to the more traditional approach—using existing statutes,
pressing and pulling Congress and the courts to read these in a light favorable to the
administration, rather than insisting on unreviewable executive power.

The Bush-Cheney Legal Legacy: Less than Zero?
While the Ninth Circuit panel decision narrowing the application of the state
secrets doctrine may well be reversed, the ruling suggests another way in which the
Bush-Cheney legal legacy could actually end up producing a more, rather than a less,
constrained executive (Wittes and Goldsmith 2009). Not only did the Bush administration lose key cases, but their underlying theories, the default assumptions they insisted
were embedded in the Constitution itself, were rejected by the Court. It is one thing to
18. Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing en banc in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, June 12, 2009.
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assert power—it is another to press the Court to rule on those assertions. Rather than
shifting the default assumptions toward greater executive autonomy, they pressed the
Court to make decisions that have actually shifted the defaults back—away from the
more executive-oriented Dames & Moore decision and back toward the classic definitions
laid out by Justice Jackson in the steel seizure case. Another president someday may
choose to revive the Bush-Cheney legal legacy, but there are now significant legal
decisions that will have to be overcome and reversed.
One of his first tasks at the Justice Department, Attorney General Eric Holder
told his audience at West Point, was to choose which portraits of former attorneys
general to place on the walls of his office. One of the portraits he chose, Holder said,
was that of former attorney general and Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson—the
author of what Holder noted was “perhaps the most important court opinion on presidential power in the last century.” Jackson’s concurring opinion in the Youngstown steel
seizure case, Holder said, “remains the gold standard to this day for defining the extent
to which the president can operate consistent with the rule of law. Jackson’s standards
are as informative today as they were prescient fifty-seven years ago” (Holder 2009).
By returning to the more traditional approach to executive power, the Obama
administration may well be able to build that power on a firmer and more lasting
foundation, one that has been the bedrock on which many other powerful chief executives
have been able to leave their branch of government legally stronger than it was when they
took over.
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